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Lack of information is a serious constraint to targeting social programs effectively,
especially in Less Developed Countries (LDCs) (Besley 1993; Ravallion 1993). Targeting social
programs involves making distinctions between "deserving" (poor) and "undeserving" (non-poor)
applicants.  But this is no simple matter in countries where household characteristics such as
income are rarely known.  In such circumstances, policy-makers intent on targeting are forced to
choose among imperfect solutions. They can rely on observable household characteristics, such
as land ownership, the ratio of working age-adults to dependents, or ownership of durable goods
that seem likely to separate poor from non-poor households. They can "self-target" programs by
designing them so that they appeal mainly to the poor--perhaps by offering employment at below-
market wages, or subsidizing foodstuffs consumed primarily by the poor.  Or they can use
"geographic targeting" to direct resources to areas in which, on average, poverty appears to be
greatest (Akerlof 1978; Besley and Kanbur 1990; Grosh 1992).
Geographic targeting is appealing because it is comparatively simple to administer.
Different parts of a country--regions, provinces, districts, even city blocks--are ranked by some
measure of deprivation.  This measure could be income-based poverty or, more commonly, an
indicator of health, educational or nutritional status, or access to basic services, such as electricity
or running water.  Resources are then allocated in inverse proportion to average welfare, so that
poor regions receive higher per capita transfers than rich ones.  Alternatively, rich areas can be
excluded from the program altogether.  The simplicity of geographic targeting is an important
advantage when lack of information or administrative capacity is a serious concern.
This paper compares a number of geographic targeting indicators that have been discussed
by policy-makers in Peru.  These include the infant mortality rate, which is used to target the
Municipal Compensation Fund, the main block grant from the central government to local
governments in Peru; a composite "poverty" index developed by the Peruvian Social Fund
(FONCODES), which FONCODES uses to target its projects; and an estimate of "imputed"
poverty which combines census and survey data in an attempt to approximate money-based
measures of welfare.
To test the potential impact on poverty of targeting with alternative indicators, I conduct a
series of simulations which combine information on household expenditures from the 1994 and
1997 Peru Living Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS) with district-level averages of various
welfare measures.  I use the results of the simulations to compare leakage rates, trace out
concentration curves, estimate the impact on various poverty measures of the Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke (FGT) family, and graph non-parametric (kernel) density estimates of the log of per
capita expenditures (PCE) when transfers are made on the basis of alternative indicators.
2The results show that geographic targeting with any of the indicators is a significant
improvement over an untargeted regime in which resources are distributed equally across all
districts.  There is, therefore, substantial potential for geographic targeting in Peru.  However,
targeting outcomes are quite similar for all of the targeting indicators I consider, and differences
in outcomes between indicators are not significant at conventional levels of significance.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 briefly describes alternative
geographic targeting indicators available in Peru.  Section 3 describes the methodology I use to
compare indicators.  It also describes altemative performance measures, identifies formulas that
can be used to allocate resources to districts, describes data requirements, and states the
assumptions made for the simulation exercise.  Section 4 summarizes the results of the analysis.
Section 5 draws conclusions.
2.  Geographic targeting indicators in Peru
In 1997 there were 13 administrative regions, 24 departments, 194 provinces, and 1812
districts in Peru (Webb and Fernandez Baca 1997, p. 112). Recent discussion about the
geographic targeting of government programs has focused on the use of district-level averages.
Districts can be quite small in Peru: According to the 1993 Population and Housing Census, the
average district population was about 12,600 inhabitants, but some, predominantly rural districts
had less than 200 inhabitants.
Infant mortality
The infant mortality rate measures the fraction of children ever born who do not reach the
first year of age.  In Peru, as in many other developing countries, one would be loathe to estimate
infant mortality on the basis of seriously incomplete death registries.  To address this problem,
demographers have developed indirect methods to estimate mortality at early ages (Hill, Zlotnik
and Trussell 1983; Brass and Macrae 1984 and 1985; Trussell and Menken 1984). The Peruvian
National Statistical Institute (INEI) used one such method--the preceding births technique--to
estimate infant mortality in Peru.
The preceding births technique requires women to report the total number of children ever
born and surviving at two different points in time.  This information was available in Peru from
the 1981 and 1993 population censuses. However, because the population of many districts is
very small, applying the preceding births technique to individual districts would have produced
highly uncertain results.  INEI therefore followed a two-stage procedure. First, it estimated the
infant mortality rate in every department, where the sample size was large enough. In addition,
INEI regressed its estimate of the infant mortality rate in every department on some of its
3correlates--indicators such as women's average education level, household characteristics, and
place of residence on which inforrnation  had been gathered in the 1993 census. In the second
stage, the coefficients from these departmental regressions were applied to district-level data from
the 1993 census to estimate district-level infant mortality rates (INEI 1997).
The FONCODES index
Peru has a long history of developing "poverty maps" based on composite indices of unmet
basic needs.  The first of these maps was constructed by Webb with information from the 1961
population census (Webb 1977). This poverty map was updated with new censuses conducted in
1972, 1981, and 1993 (Amat y Le6n n.d.; Banco Central de Reserva 1981; INEI 1994).
FONCODES, in turn, has developed composite poverty maps since its creation in 1991, often
with technical assistance from the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and the
German development agency GTZ.
The current district-level poverty map was developed by FONCODES and the Ministry of
the Presidency.  It is based on eight indicators--the rate of chronic malnutrition, illiteracy, school-
aged children not in school, overcrowded housing, inadequate roofing, and the proportion of the
population without access to water, sewerage, and electricity. All of these indicators except the
rate of chronic malnutrition were estimated with data from the 1993 population census. The rate
of chronic malnutrition was estimated from a census of height and weight among school-aged
children, also conducted in 1993 (FONCODES 1995 and 1996).
Composite indices invariably involve some arbitrary weighting of individual indicators.
The 1996 index standardized each indicator by dividing it by its minimum value, multiplied the
rate of chronic malnutrition by seven, and then added all of the individual indicators'  For ease of
interpretation, FONCODES then standardized the index by dividing all values by the lowest
value.  The resulting index ranges from a value of 1 to 36.38.
Imputed poverty and income
In Peru, there are no survey-based estimates of income or expenditures at a level more
disaggregated than the department: for example, household surveys conducted by INEI, which
generally have sample sizes of 15,000 to 20,000 households, can only be used to compare income
i This  procedure  had the unintended  consequence  that  the greatest  weight  was given  to those  indicators
with  the greatest  variance. Thus,  while  the intended  weights  were 50%  for the rate  of chronic  malnutrition,
and  7.14%  each for the seven  other  measures,  the actual  weights  in  the index  turned  out to be 15.3%  for the
rate of chronic  malnutrition,  and 3.4%,  2.2%,  3.0%,  38.3%,  8.8%,  7.4%,  and  21.6% for the measures  of
illiteracy,  school  attendance,  overcrowding,  inadequate  roofing,  and  access  to water, sewerage  and
electricity,  respectively  (World  Bank 1996,  p. 7).
4across "natural  regions"  and departments. 2 But INEI has combined  variables  which are common
to both the 1993  census  and one such  survey  conducted  in 1995  to develop  imputed  district-level
measures  of income  and poverty  (INEI 1996).
This procedure  is conceptually  similar  to that used  to estimate  infant  mortality  at the
district level. INEI estimated  income  in 1995  on the basis of the household  survey,  and then
regressed  income in every department  on its correlates--household  composition,  education  levels,
access  to basic  services  such  as water,  sewerage  and electricity,  ownership  of durable  goods,  such
as television,  radio  and refrigerator,  and other  variables  included  in both the census  and the
survey. The coefficients  from the 24 department-level  regressions  were then used  to impute
average income in every  district,  and the fraction  of the population  in each district  below an
income-based  poverty  line.
3.  The analytic framework
Measures ofperformance
The simplest  measure  of targeting  focuses  on leakage  and undercoverage  rates (Grosh,  pp.
16-17;  Baker and Grosh 1994). A poverty  line is chosen  to separate  "poor" from "non-poor".
Leakage  rates are then defined  as the fraction  of total program  resources  which  go to the non-
poor, and undercoverage  rates as the fraction  of the poor  who do not benefit from the program.
By this measure,  better geographic  targeting  indicators  result in lower leakage  and lower
undercoverage  rates.
A second approach  simply  ranks individuals  by an indicator  of welfare-say, per capita
expenditures-and then cumulates  the fraction  of households  and the fraction  of resources
transferred  by different  indicators. The  results  are often  presented  in terms of so-called
"concentration  curves" (see, for example,  Milanovic  1995),  and I follow  this practice  below. By
this measure,  the best targeting  indicator  is that whose  concentration  curve  is above  all others at
every  point. The concentration  curve  method  does  not require  use of a poverty  line, which  may
be an advantage  given the fact that setting  poverty  lines  can be contentious.
Alternatively,  one might  want to compare  the changes  in various  poverty  measures  which
are likely to result when  transfers  are based  on alternative  targeting  indicators  (Chaudhuri  and
Ravallion 1994). This is an exercise  in comparative  statics:  what is total poverty  before  and
2 These natural  regions  are Lima,  and  the urban  and  rural areas  of the coast, sierra  (highlands),  and selva
(3ungle),  respectively.  Natural  regions  do not, in  general,  correspond  to the administrative  regions
mentioned  before.
3 The methodology  applied  by INEI  for these  imputations  is similar  in spirit  to that  proposed  in Hentschel
et. al (2000).
5immediately after the transfer?  By this measure, the preferred geographic targeting indicator
directs limited resources to areas where they would have the greatest short-term impact on
poverty.  More complex formulations, which might model the expected long-term returns from
transfers to different districts, are beyond the scope of this paper (see the comments by
Binswanger 1989, cited in Ravallion 1993).
In what follows I use three poverty measures from the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT)
family--the headcount index, the poverty gap, and the P2 measure (Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke
1984). The FGT family of poverty measures follows the general formulation below:
N  a
(1)  Pa=  - (1i- yi /z)  (forally,  < z)
where y is income, z the poverty line, and a  is a parameter which represents the aversion to
inequality.  When a=O, Po  corresponds to the headcount index--the number of people below the
poverty line; when oa=  1, P1 corresponds to the poverty gap--a sum of the individual shortfalls in
income for those below the poverty line, as a fraction of the poverty line itself.  As a  increases,
the measure gives a greater weight to the poorest poor, and at very high values of a P,,
approaches a "Rawlsian" measure of welfare which gives weight only to the poorest household.
The P2 measure corresponds to a value of  a=2.
Finally, one could look at changes in the entire distribution of log PCE, rather than just at
changes for those below the poverty line. I use non-parametric (kernel) density estimates for this
purpose.
Allocationformulas
When there is no targeting, districts are simply allocated resources according to their share
of the total population in the country, and everyone is assumed to receive the same per capita
transfer.  This no-targeting scenario serves as a benchmark to measure additional reductions in
poverty that could be achieved when geographic targeting is conducted on the basis of some
welfare indicator.
To compare targeting indicators, one must develop a formula which allocates resources
across districts.  I consider one such formula, which is relevant for Peru because it has been the
basis of targeting by FONCODES, the program which made the most significant early advances
developing targeting indicators in Peru.  FONCODES ranks all districts by its poverty index.  It
then allocates resources to each district according to the following formula:
6(2)  Allocation,  (Index, * Population,)
i  (Index,  * Population,)
j=1
The "FONCODES method" thus makes all districts in the country eligible for benefits, but
weights the population of each one by its poverty index. For example, Coronel Castaffeda,  the
district with the highest value of the FONCODES index (36.38), and a population of 607
inhabitants, would be allocated (36.38*607)/346,201,217 = .0064% of the total budget for that
year.  By contrast, Pacocha, the district with the lowest value of the FONCODES index (1.00),
and a population of 6500, would be allocated (1*6,500)/346,201,217 = .0019% of the total budget
for that year.  Per capita allocations to inhabitants of Coronel Castafieda Castaiieda would
therefore be almost 37 times per capita allocations to inhabitants of Pacocha 4 Note that if the
index is a poverty rate, allocations to district i simply correspond to the fraction of the poor who
live in district i.  I adapt the "FONCODES method" to other indicators by substituting the infant
mortality rates and the imputed poverty measure for the FONCODES index in equation (2)
above, and compute the corresponding district-level allocations.
The simulations in this paper make a number of assumptions. The most important
assumption is that there is no targeting of program resources within a given district. This is
clearly unrealistic: Paxson and Schady (1999) use non-parametric regressions to estimate the
probability of benefiting from social programs as a function of the number of standard deviations
a given household's income is above or below mean district income. Their results show that the
within-district distribution of investments made by FONCODES and the food distribution
program PRONAA is hump-shaped, peaking at about one-standard deviation above mean district
income, while the within-district distribution of investments made by the school construction
program INFES is regressive, rising with household income. A more plausible assumption for
the simulations in this paper is that the degree of within-district targeting is independent of the
4 In actual  fact, FONCODES'  allocation  mechanism  is a little  more  complicated  than  this. FONCODES
first allocates  60%  of resources  to rural areas  and  40% to urban  areas. The final allocation  to each district
is then  the sum of the rural  and urban  allocations--standardized  to add  up to 100%, Ad hoc adjustments  are
also  made to privilege  border  areas,  to coordinate  investments  with  other  public  sector  programs,  and to
ensure  that each of FONCODES'  regional  offices  (which  correspond  roughly  to individual  departments)
has a minimum  operating  budget. I do not take  these  "refinements"  into account  in  the simulations  below.
5 Of course,  this is only  one  of a potentially  infinitely  large  number  of fortnulas  which  could  be used.  For
example,  the Technical  Team  of the Ministry  of the Presidency  has  proposed  an allocation  formula  which
makes  a distinction  between  districts  with  a high  proportion  of poor  people  (as measured  by the
FONCODES  index)  and districts  with  a large  number  of poor  people  (as  measured  by the product  of the
FONCODES  index and population).  Proposed  investments  would  then  be directed  to 262 districts  with  the
highest  proportion  of the population  in poverty  and  232 districts  with  the highest  number  of people in
poverty. The final  count is 419 of Peru's 1812  districts,  because  some  districts  have a high  value  of the
FONCODES  index  and a high  value  of the product  of the index  and  population.
7choice of welfare indicator which is used to distribute resources across  districts.  Under this
assumption, which seems quite reasonable, the actual estimates of changes in poverty under
different targeting regimes will be biased (up, if there is positive intra-district targeting, down if
the converse is true), but the preferred rank-order of the indicators used to assign resources across
districts should be unaffected.
The simulations assume that benefits from program investments in a district accrue entirely
to the residents of that district.  This might not hold, say, if beneficiaries of a food distribution
program implemented in one district are residents of a different district. But intra-district spill-
overs are unlikely to be systematic--that is, they should not consistently favor residents of one
kind of district over residents of another.  Intra-district spill-overs should therefore not affect the
rank order of indicators either.
Some additional assumptions have to be made about the impact of transfers on various
poverty measures.  Poverty in Peru has generally been defined as an individual's inability to meet
a specified level of expenditures-the  poverty line-when  individual expenditures are
approximated by total household expenditures divided by the number of eligible household
members. 6 We must therefore translate expenditures by social programs into household
expenditures--by first translating program expenditures into changes in household income, and
then estimating the proportion of additional disposable income that is spent.  As a matter of
convenience, I have assumed that all program expenditures translate into additional household
income and that all of this additional income is spent7
Finally, the simulations assume that the cost of administering programs is constant across
regions, and ignore the effects of transfers on behavior such as migration towards districts which
6 The 1995  and 1996  INEI  household  surveys,  which  used income  to measure  poverty,  are exceptions.
7Two  points are worth  noting  here. First,  many  social  programs  in Peru are involved  with  the construction
of small-scale  infrastructure.  The wages  paid  to laborers  in these  projects  are only  a fraction  of the total
cost,  and other  benefits--say,  of having  an additional  classroom--are  unlikely  to have  a short-term  impact
on household  income. We can easily  relax  the assumption  of a one-for-one  equivalence  between  changes
in program  expenditures  and changes  in household  income,  however,  if we simply  model  a smaller  budget.
For example,  if only  50% of the expenditures  on poverty  alleviation  programs  translate  into short-term
increases  in income,  the "relevant"  budget  would  be only  half the actual  budget. Second,  households
typically  do not spend  all of an increase  in income. Assuming  that all households  spend  a fixed  fraction  of
additional  income  is not entirely  satisfactory  either,  because  the marginal  propensity  to save  is likely  to
differ  systematically  across  households.  For example,  if the fraction  of income  that is saved  is higher in
rich districts  than in poor districts,  simulations  based  on a constant  marginal  propensity  to save  might
under-estimate  the short-term  impact  of program  investments  in  poor districts  relative  to rich districts,  and
under-estimate  the relative  performance  of targeting  indicators  which  assign  a higher  share  of their
resources  to the poorest  districts. One potential  solution  would  be to estimate  marginal  propensities  to save
for households  from the LSMS  itself. The simplest  way to do this would  be to convert  measures  of income
and expenditures  into current  prices,  and then  take the difference  between  them as a measure  of savings
(see especially  Paxson 1992). By this measure,  however,  almost  two-thirds  (61%)  of households  in the
1994  LSMS  dissaved. This  seems  unreasonable  and suggests  that income  in these surveys  is seriously
underestimated  vis-a-vis  expenditures.
8receive large per capita transfers, offsetting reductions in private intra-household transfers or
employment, and the impact of taxes needed to finance poverty alleviation programs.
The data set
For all of the estimations below, I combine information from two sources: district-level
averages of the infant mortality rate, the FONCODES index, and the measure of imputed poverty,
and household-level data on expenditures. District-level averages are available from INEI, and
household-level data can be estimated from the 1994 and 1997 LSMS, both of which were
executed by the Peruvian think-tank Cuanto.
District-level data can be used to estimate the proportion of total funds that would be
allocated to every district under alternative targeting regimes.  Further dividing this fraction by
the total population of the district in question allows us to calculate the proportion of funds that
would be allocated to every individual.  Finally, multiplying this proportion by the total budget
available for poverty alleviation programs, we can estimate per capita transfers.
The LSMS can be used to estimate the expenditures of the households in the sample (3,558
for 1994, and 3,840 for 1997) and, dividing total household expenditures by household size, for
household members (18,362 for 1994 and 19,562 for 1997). These estimates can be combined
with information on poverty lines to calculate the headcount index, poverty gap, and P2 measure
at a national level before any transfers take place.8
The 1994 and 1997 Peru LSMS drew households from 364 and 397 clusters, respectively,
and the accompanying literature lists the districts from which each one of these clusters was
drawn.  Observations in the LSMS can be coded manually with district identifiers which match
those used by INEI, and district-level and household-level data can then be merged.  Having done
this, we keep only those observations for which there are matching codes for place of residence in
both data sets--in effect, discarding the district-level information for all but the 199 and 238
districts which were sampled in the 1994 and 1997 LSMS, respectively. 9 The new, composite
s Note that  regional  price deflators  available  from  Cuanto  and INEI  are used throughout  the paper  to deflate
both  household  expenditures  and simulated  transfers.
9  In theory,  the first  step in the FGT  approach  implemented  in  the simulations  in this paper would  divide  a
given budget  amongst  the 1812  districts  in  Peru. How much  gets allocated  to each  district  would  then
depend  on the targeting  indicator  and the allocation  formula  in question. But the fact  that  households  in the
1994  and 1997  LSMS  were only drawn  from 199  and  238 districts  across  the country,  respectively,  raises a
potential  problem:  since  every targeting  indicator  allocates  a different  amount  to each district,  the total
budget  for this sample  of districts  would  not  be constant  across  indicators.  For example,  the proportion  of
the total budget  allocated  to the 199  districts  in the 1994  LSMS  would  be smaller  by the FONCODES
index than by the measure  of imputed  poverty. As a result,  the total amount  transferred  to the 3,558
households  in the survey  would  be smaller  when  we use the FONCODES  index  than when  we use the
imputed  poverty  measure,  even  after each  household  in  the survey is weighted  by its expansion  factor. At
the heart of the problem  is the fact  that  the LSMS  draws a nationally-representative  sample  of households
9data set is representative in exactly the same way as the original LSMS data set, and can be used
to make reasonable simulations about changes in expenditures and poverty at the national level. .
4.  Results
What is the effect of geographic targeting with alternative indicators in Peru?  As a first
step towards answering this question, I present estimates of poverty and allocations of funds by
region.  About two-thirds of the population of Peru lives in urban areas, and well over a third of
these urban residents live in the capital city, Lima.  Table 1 decomposes poverty measures and
allocations by alternative geographic targeting indicators into three categories: Lima, other urban,
and rural.  The values in each cell correspond to the proportion of total poverty or the proportion
of total allocations by region, so that every row sums to 100%. Here, and for all of the results
presented in the paper, individuals in the household surveys are weighted with the appropriate
expansion factors.
Since the no targeting scenario makes an equal transfer to every Peruvian, regional
allocations when there is no targeting correspond exactly to the fraction of the population living
in each region.  A comparison of these allocations with the various poverty measures shows that
poverty in urban areas is below average: about 29% of the population lives in Lima, but only 14%
to 22% of total poverty was found there in 1994, and 13% to 20% in 1997.  Other urban areas
account for about 36% of the population, and about one-third of poverty.  Poverty in rural areas,
by contrast, is well above average: just over one-third of the population lives in rural areas, but
between 44% and 55% of poverty was found there in 1994, and as much as 47% to 57% in 1997.
Table  1 suggests that geographic targeting using any of the indicators under consideration
appears to approximate the distribution of poverty reasonably well.  When any of these indicators
is used for geographic targeting, about one-half of all resources are transferred to rural areas, and
about two-thirds of the remaining resources to urban areas outside Lima.  Comparing the three
indicators, the FONCODES index transfers more to Lima than the measures of infant mortality
and imputed poverty, while the measure of infant mortality makes the largest transfers to rural
areas.
irrespective  of the district  in which  these  households  live. If a number  of samples  were drawn,  on average,
the total  budget  would  be the same  across  indicators,  but this does  not hold  for any  one sample. I have
corrected  for this problem  by normalizing  the budget-in effect,  summing  equation  (2) above  only over  the
sample  of districts  in  the LSMS. Note that this  is not an issue  with  the concentration  curve approach
because  concentration  curves  graph  out the  proportion of a given  budget  that is allocated  to each household
10Leakage rates
Table 2 presents leakage rates by targeting indicator.  The leakage rate when there is no
targeting (46.50 in 1994, and 51.15 in 1997) corresponds exactly to the fraction of the population
which is not in poverty.  Table 2 shows that leakage rates would be minimized with geographic
targeting by the infant mortality rate (according to the 1994 LSMS) or the FONCODES index
(according to the 1997 LSMS). Bootstrapped standard errors (not reported, but available from the
author upon request) suggest that geographic targeting with any of the indicators in question is a
significant improvement on the no targeting scenario, while the differences in outcomes across
indicators are not significant.
Concentration curves
Initial simulations show that the concentration curves for the FONCODES index, the infant
mortality rate, and the imputed poverty rate are so close to each other as to be virtually
indistinguishable from each other on a graph. For the sake of clarity, I therefore graph the
difference between each of the concentration curves and the no targeting baseline case in Figures
1.1 and 1.2. (The "concentration curve" for the no targeting scenario is a straight, forty-five
degree line: every individual receives the same transfer, so the cumulative fraction of the transfer
equals the cumulative fraction of the population at every point).  Figure 1.1 shows that this
difference is positive throughout for all three curves: no matter where we take the cut-off between
"poor" and "non-poor" to be, the poor receive a larger share of transfers when these are made on
the basis of the infant mortality rate, the FONCODES index, or the measure of imputed poverty
than when transfers are not targeted.  Figures 1  .1 and 1.2 also show that no single concentration
curve lies everywhere above all others, although the FONCODES index curve always transfers
more resources to poor households than the imputed poverty measure.  This is noteworthy given
that much recent effort has gone into developing these kinds of measures, in Peru and elsewhere.
Changes in poverty
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 consider the impact of alternative geographic targeting regimes on
poverty at various budget levels between 10 million soles and 5 billion soles (for a similar
approach see Chaudhuri and Ravallion 1994, and Jalan and Ravallion 1998). As a point of
reference, the Ministry of the Presidency, the single largest implementing agency of social
in  the survey-weighted, once again,  by the appropriate  expansion  factors. Because  concentration  curves
are mean-normalized  in this way, the results  are budget-independent.
11programs in Peru, spent 2.2 billion soles on programs which could be targeted in 1995.10  For the
sake of parsimony, I present graphs only for the poverty gap measure. Results for the headcount
index and the P2 measure, which are available from the author upon request, are very similar."
Once again, because targeting outcomes with different indicators are very similar to each
other but are clearly superior to the no targeting regime, I graph the differences in poverty gaps.
One way to understand the graphs is therefore as a double-difference: the first difference is the
change in the poverty gap when a given budget is transferred-separately,  for the no targeting
scenario, and for geographic targeting using the FONCODES index, the infant mortality rate, and
the measure of imputed poverty.  The second difference is the difference between the change in
the poverty gap under the no targeting scenario, on the one hand, and the changes in the poverty
gap when there is targeting by a given indicator.  The value of the y-axis at any given budget and
for any given curve is therefore the additional increase in the poverty gap which could be attained
from switching from no targeting to targeting with the indicator in question.
Impact on povet:  Like the concentration curve analysis, Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show that
targeting with any one of the indicators in question is clearly preferable to no geographic
targeting: all of the curves are above zero throughout.  Figures 2.1 and 2.2 also show that none of
the indicators clearly outperforms the others, although transfers based on imputed poverty appear
to result in smaller decreases in poverty than the corresponding transfers made on the basis of
infant mortality or the FONCODES index. 12
Budget savings: Table 3 presents the same information from a different angle: it considers
the impact on the headcount index, poverty gap, and P2 measures of spending the 2.2 billion sol
reference budget without geographic targeting, and estimates the budget that would be necessary
to achieve this same reduction in poverty when geographic targeting is conducted by the infant
mortality rate, imputed poverty, or FONCODES index, respectively.  The results show that the
'° These expenditures  included  programs  in housing  (Banco  de Materiales,  ENACE),  potable  water,
sanitation,  and electricity  (UTE-FONAVI),  educational  infrastructure  (INFES),  food and  nutrition
(PRONAA),  social  services  (INABIF),  and numerous  multi-sectoral  programs  (FONCODES,  COOPOP,
INADE)  (World  Bank 1996).
'  The curves  for the headcount  index  tend  to be much more  choppy. The  reason  for this is that  transfers
will not reduce  the headcount  index  unless  at least  one person  in the country  (or,  in this case,  one  person  in
the survey)  is bumped  over  the poverty  line. This  need not happen,  for example,  if resources  are spent  on
those who are well below  the poverty  line. An increase  in expenditures  on the poor will always  reduce
poverty,  however,  if poverty  is measured  by the poverty  gap or P 2 measures.
12 Once  again,  bootstrapped  standard  errors  suggest  that  the differences  between,  on the one hand,  the no
targeting  case and,  on the other  hand,  the measures  of imputed  poverty,  infant  mortality,  and  FONCODES
index are statistically  significant  at the 1%  level or better. The differences  between  the infant  mortality
rate, FONCODES  index and imputed  poverty  are not significant  (estimates  available  from the author  upon
request).
12headcount  index  could  be reduced  by the same  amount  with a budget  which is 159  million  to 361
million  soles smaller;  the poverty  gap could  be reduced  by the same  amount  with a budget  which
is between  288 million  and 353 million  soles  smaller;  while  the P2 measure,  finally, could  be
reduced  by the same  amount  with a budget  which is 309 to 397  million soles  smaller. Clearly,
substantial  savings  can be achieved  with geographic  targeting  in Peru.
Non-parametric density estimates
Figure 3.  1, finally, graphs  the non-parametric  (kernel)  density  estimates  of the log of PCE
after hypothetical  transfers  totaling  2.2 billion soles  have been  made to households  in the 1997
LSMS. I do not show  the comparable  picture  for 1994  because  it is very similar  indeed. To
avoid cluttering  the picture,  and because  outcomes  are so similar  across indicators,  I present
density estimates  for the FONCODES  index  and the no targeting  scenario  only. A vertical  line
which corresponds  to the log of PCE at the poverty  line is also included. Figure 3.1 clearly shows
that the left tail of the distribution  for the no targeting  scenario  has more  mass than the
corresponding  distribution  for the FONCODES  index:  that is, the fraction  of people  with very
low levels of income  would be higher  had transfers  to districts  been  based simply  on population
rather  than on the FONCODES  index. By contrast,  more  mass is concentrated  around the middle
of the distribution  when  transfers  are made  using  the FONCODES  index. The  cumulative  density
functions  of log PCE (not presented,  but available  from the author  upon request)  show that the
distribution  corresponding  to the FONCODES  index  first-order  stochastically  dominates  the no
targeting  distribution  up to the poverty  line (the two distributions  intersect  at about the poverty
line).
5.  Conclusion
Geographic  targeting  of social  programs  has become increasingly  important  in Peru.
Expenditures  in basic health,  primary  education,  nutrition  programs,  and basic  justice conducted
by the regular line ministries  through  the Basic Social  Expenditure  Improvement  Plan have
generally  been directed  towards  the poorest  departments.  The  Municipal  Compensation  Fund,  the
main block grant from  the central  government  to local governments  in Peru, is allocated  with a
formula  which takes into account  the population,  infant  mortality  rate, and proportion  rural in
each district. FONCODES  has used its own  poverty  maps since 1992,  and other  programs  in the
Ministry of the Presidency  have  been encouraged  to prioritize  investments  in a sub-sample  of
districts.
In this context,  it is important  to see how well different  targeting  indicators  perform  in
practice. This paper  evaluates  alternative  indicators  for geographic  targeting  available  at the
13district level in Peru.  I use a number of outcome measures to compare geographic targeting
indicators: leakage rates; concentration curve analysis; the impact of transfers on poverty as
measured by the headcount index, poverty gap and FGT P 2 measure; and non-parametric density
estimates of the log of per capita expenditures when transfers are made on the basis of competing
indicators.  The results in this paper suggest that there are large potential pay-offs to geographic
targeting in Peru.  But differences between geographic targeting indicators-the  FONCODES
index, the infant mortality rate, and the measure of imputed poverty-are  small.
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16Table  1: Distribution  of poverty and allocated  expenditures,  by region and targeting
indicator
Year  Lima  Other  urban  Rural
Headcount  index  94  22.49  33.18  44.33
97  20.24  32.66  47.11
Poverty  gap  94  17.43  31.86  50.71
97  15.62  31.55  52.82
P2 measure  94  14.29  30.91  54.79
97  12.87  30.61  56.52
Imputed  poverty  94  15.46  35.40  49.14
97  15.76  36.53  47.71
Infant  mortality  94  13.46  33.49  53.05
97  13.99  33.39  52.62
FONCODES  index  94  16.85  30.45  52.71
97  16.59  32.62  50.78
No targeting  94  28.52  36.09  35.39
97  28.85  35.56  35.56
17Table  2: Leakage rates, by targeting  indicator
Leakage rate
94  97
Imputed  poverty  40.77  44.56
Infant  mortality  39.97  44.45
FONCODES  index  40.09  43.76
No targeting  46.50  51.15
Table  3: Estimated  savings associated with geographic  targeting,  by indicator
Year  Estimated  savings (million soles)
Hleadcountindex  Poverty gap  P2 measure
Imputed  poverty  94  159.4  287.6  320.9
97  280.8  303.3  308.9
FONCODES  index  94  226.6  336.4  396.9
97  347.4  336.9  348.6
Infant  mortality  94  176.7  355.1  355.3
97  361.4  353.2  370.1
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